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  Maryvonne Saison 
Abstract
It is through the ideal of a sensus communis that Aesthetics
has offered to Philosophy an articulation to Politics. I will
question the idea of an "aesthetic sociability" through the
concept of "régime esthétique" (aesthetic regime) proposed by
Jacques Rancière to define the 18th century fundamental
change carried by Aesthetics in order to think art and
sensibility together.
One question will be the central core of my essay, which is
how to understand nowadays Deleuze’s assertion that art
should be "contributing to the invention of a people."
Consensus and dissensus are two reefs between which art and
philosophy navigate at sight, two sources of attraction of which
probably none should be favoured.
Key Words
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1. Aesthetic Sociability, the "Aesthetic Regime of Art"
and the "New Distribution of the Sensible"
It is useful to keep in mind that aesthetics, this philosophical
discipline born of philosophy, is one link in a system, and that
this system itself forms part of a history. If aesthetics was
born in the 18th century, some have celebrated its death since
the end of the 20th, and its life has been only a series of
challenges, which, for better and for worse, it has survived.
While stating his desire to go "against the grain of the
arguments of contemporary anti-aesthetic discourse," Jacques
Rancière continues the tradition and gives new life to the
"aesthetic malaise," which he considers to be "as old as
aesthetics itself." His aim is to identify what he calls here the
"aesthetic regime:"[1] a "new and paradoxical regime of
identifying what belongs to art," born in the 18th century.
What the philosophers achieved, according to him, was the
elaboration of a regime of intelligibility within which a whole
series of reconfigurations became thinkable. "Under the name
of aesthetics," he writes, "they firstly grasped and thought the
fundamental displacement: what belonged to art from now on
was less and less identified according to the pragmatic criteria
of 'ways of doing'. It was more and more identified in terms of
'modes of sensibility'."[2] Art, as the single identifier for
multiple practices as well as sensibility, receives a new
visibility and new powers under this regime. Because of this
very fact it arouses expectations and engenders
disappointments. An unstable and precarious equilibrium is the
price paid by this new regime for its foundational paradox
when it refers to the mystery that binds human nature and
social life without being able to explain it. At the heart of the
mystery, at the origin of all the fantasies, is the idea of a
common sense.
From Baumgarten to Kant to the last works of classical
aesthetics (I am thinking, for example, of Mikel Dufrenne's
Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique [Phenomenology of
Aesthetic Experience], just to mention this swan song in the
exact middle of the 20th century), thus from the 18th century
to the 21st, this is effectively the shadowy question at the
heart of these endeavors. Is there any more recurrent illusion
than that of a fortunate encounter with a work, artistic or
natural, and with a look? Dufrenne constantly celebrates this
happy and reciprocal affinity, this free fellowship, this harmony
without any discernible cause which manifests itself in a pure
perceptual experience. Kant's regulative idea of a sensus
communis is the pivot of those systems conceived under the
jurisdiction of the aesthetic. It is via the utopia of a common
sense that aesthetics becomes necessary to philosophy as a
way of articulating its political dimension. If aesthetic
experience testifies to a "commonality" in the realm of feeling,
the spectator that Dufrenne describes, this witness to the
work, plays ipso facto the role of a general public without
sacrificing its singularity. Constituting a virtual public by
assembling spectators testifies to a possible universality, one
that founds a united world and human community. This
"aesthetic sociability," an indispensable ingredient of classical
aesthetic thought and the pivot of Dufrenne's
phenomenology,[3] has been violently contested from various
angles, converging in the denunciation of a utopia linked to
the aesthetic status of artistic activity.
Also inaugurated in effect by the aesthetic regime is a new
"distribution of the sensible," to use Jacques Rancière's terms
again. The accord between human nature and social nature is
broken, that accord which, after making the connection
between art and sensibility, opposed the sensibility of the man
of taste to that of his fall-guy, who Voltaire[4] referred to as
the "coarse" man: "The nature," Rancière writes, "that
partnered works of art with sensibilities, attached them to a
distribution of the sensible that put artists in their place and
separated those concerned with art and those not concerned
with it." The new state of affairs is one where "the hierarchy of
subjects and publics" becomes muddled, where works of art
are related to popular "genius" and offer themselves to the
unqualified gaze. This suspension of the previous accord is the
reason according to Rancière for the development of two
tendencies that generate the aesthetic malaise: the flourishing
of an art with no standards [normes] or criteria, more or less
deprofessionalised or showing no specific skill, and the
effacement of the boundaries separating life and art—"the
scandal," Rancière writes, "of an art whose forms and places
welcome the "whatever" of functional objects and images of
profane life; exorbitant and deceptive promises of an aesthetic
revolution that sought to transform the forms of art into the
forms of a new life." Aesthetic questions are no longer posed
within the limits imposed by these boundaries and mobilise the
idea of "the people."
The sociability that Dufrenne inscribes at the heart of the
aesthetic corresponds well to this new distribution of the
sensible. With the universalisation of the aesthetic relation, we
can see in it the sign of a globalisation of its inherent
paradoxes. At the centre of this apparatus is the concept of the
spectator and that of the public, hinging around a form of
reception that is conceived in terms of availability. There is an
accord between individual and assembled spectators such that
they are, before the art work, witnesses and accomplices. To
raise oneself to the level of "what is universal in the human,"
as Dufrenne writes in La phénoménologie de l'expérience
esthétique,[5] is both to invoke the universality of the
judgment of taste or aesthetic pleasure and to declare its
existence, via the existence of a public who testifies for a "we"
beyond singularities and differences. But in Dufrenne, the "real
community" of the public is entirely subordinated to the
"eminent objectivity of the art work": works of art have a
precedence over the experience they call forth. It's for this
reason that he concludes: "the objectivity of the work and the
demands it implies both imposes and guarantees the reality of
the social bond."
It is not my intention here to draw attention to the complexity
and fraughtness of a thought torn between the respect for
masterpieces and the utopia of a society in which artistic
creation would be within everybody's reach. It is rather to
highlight the ambiguities of the ideal of aesthetic sociability in
classical aesthetics—newly illuminated by Rancière's analysis—
an ideal founded on both the universality of human nature and
the quality of certain works, regardless of the political
conception that this idea invokes. A political reflection on the
way in which aesthetics, as Rancière[6] says, conceives the
"paradoxical sensorium which henceforth allows us to define
what belongs to art," is nevertheless required in order to
demanded reflect on the moments of differentiated by this
philosopher: a representative regime prior to the 18th century,
then, called forth by the aesthetic regime, the reign of an
ethics that dissolves the specificity of artistic and political
practices, erases any distinction between fact and right, and
identifies "all forms of discourse and practice from the same
indiscriminate point of view."
What can we make of the sensus communis today, and what
shall we think about aesthetic sociability. These are the
questions guiding a reflection in which I will focus on the idea
of the "people."
2. From the Aesthetic Community to the People Who Are
Missing
Let's start with this community that both philosophers and
statesmen have hoped to realize via art and the aesthetic: an
abstract or at the very least a virtual community. This only
acquires meaning from the perspective of its lamented
absence. It is not so much the empirical details of
disagreements that are the focus of attention as the meaning
given to its invocation using the term "the people." Paul Klee
provides an echo of this when he speaks about the difficulty of
creating in the absence of a community that carries him. In a
paper given at Lena in 1924, he dreams of "a work of vast
scope," of a "Great Work" and confesses. "We have found its
parts, but not yet the whole. This last force is lacking for want
of a people that carries us."[7]
Gilles Deleuze, in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, makes a
connection between Klee, Kafka and Carmelo Bene around the
theme of "the missing people." Cinema is the starting point of
his politically-focused reflection: "Resnais and the Straubs are
probably the greatest political film-makers in the West in
modern cinema. But, oddly, this is not through the presence of
the people. On the contrary, it is because they know how to
show how the people are what is missing, what is not
there."[8] The absence of the people is even, in this
philosopher's eyes, "the first big difference between classical
and modern cinema." In the first case, "the people are there,
even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though
blind or unconscious"—the same illusion "which calls different
peoples into the same melting-pot from which the future
emerges" can be found, before the war, from the Soviet
empire to the United States. Since this time, history has
ruined the hope that cinema can become "the revolutionary or
democratic art, which will convert the masses into a genuine
subject." After the subjection of the masses under Hitler, the
tyrannical unity of Stalinism and the break-up of the American
people, Deleuze concludes, "if there were a modern political
cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist,
or not yet. . . ." In 1985 Deleuze connects the theme of
minority that he elaborated with Félix Guattari in Kafka[9] in
1975 with his thoughts on cinema in order to set art the task
of "contributing to the invention of a people." "The moment
the master, or the colonizer proclaims 'there have never been
people here,' the missing people are a becoming, they invent
themselves, in shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new
conditions of struggle to which a necessarily political art must
contribute."
It is worth noting here, in parallel to these philosophical
thoughts, that the people entered the historical stage in 1789
when it was constituted as a political body by the French
Revolution.[10] Would art be a by-product or echo of that
Revolution in its invention or reinvention of "the people"? Does
not Deleuze assign to art (and thus to aesthetics) a political
vocation, one that is based on the resistance and inventive
abilities of minorities, but is related less to the people's
constitution as a political body than to the utopia of a virtual
community, of an audience-people on which art and culture
are founded? Is it therefore necessary to refer to a political
regime of art?
The response to these questions proceeds via an examination
of the articulation of the public and the private. Deleuze makes
a return to Kafka, opposing the maintenance of a boundary
between the political and the private in major literatures, and
its suppression in minor ones. The same phenomena occurs in
cinema. While classical cinema, the philosopher suggests, has
constantly "maintained this boundary which marked the
correlation of the political and the private, and which allowed,
via a consciousness-raising process, passage from one social
force to another, from one political position to another,"[11]
in modern political cinema, "the private affair merges with the
social—or political—immediate." In the arrangement that
separates the political and the private, the only echo from one
sphere to another proceeds via a raising of consciousness,
which can only grasp "the juxtaposition of two violences and
the continuation of one by the other." Michel Foucault arrived
at similar conclusions in his reflections on biopolitics, or when
he highlighted in his seminars the numerous historical
reversals that had the effect of inverting the dominated-
dominant positions—this led him ipso facto to relativize any
absolute judgment. By also definitively challenging the
demand to raise one's consciousness, a whole conception of
the writer, the artist, and the intellectual in general is swept
away and reconceived. The model of the universal intellectual
is long deceased. Deleuze and Foucault promoted the figure of
the specific intellectual, who engages in regional struggles,
concrete and timely actions in the field. It is in this new
context that the articulation of the political and the private is
posed anew.
The context of regional struggles leads however to the
contradiction that one actually encounters between the
plurality of minorities and the utopian unity of a fraternal
community, between the multiplication of peoples and the idea
of a missing people as a regulative political idea of the value
of the minority. We can see this difficulty in a comment by
Deleuze that follows the moment he envisions the
consequences of abandoning the "consciousness, evolution,
revolution" sequence, this essential schema of reversal in the
context of the classical cinema: "The death knell for
consciousness-raising was precisely the consciousness that
there was no people, but always several peoples, an infinity of
peoples, who remained to be united, or should not be united,
in order for the problem to change. It is in this way that third-
world cinema is a cinema of minorities, because the people
exist only in the condition of minority, which is why they are
missing. It is in minorities that private business is immediately
political." The identification of the private with the political is
to do with its localisation within minorities and the prospect of
passing from the plurality of peoples to the singularity of
apeople no longer seems self-evident. How can we reconcile
the idea that the people only exist in a state of minority, the
plurality of minorities and peoples, and the value attached to
the invention of an absent people?
The sharpness of the question paves the way for responses
from the field of sociology, which contributes to sounding the
death-knell of the aesthetic regime and the values of
universality and consensus associated with it. Some[12] go
further than this rupture with the fantasy of a harmonious
community by referring to the quarrel over contemporary art
that broke out in the 1990s, in which they see the weight of all
forms of dissensus, aesthetic and artistic. It would however be
a weak interpretation of Deleuze's thought if we understood its
invocation of minorities in this way. If consensus belongs to
the majority, and if the minor artist goes through a state of
crisis, dissensus is never the object of a new unanimity. It
concerns neither the unavoidable nor the desirable. If the
private realm has a political value, it is only to the extent that
a new culture is invented, immediately valid for everyone. It is
a matter of substituting a new modality for the representative
regime of art, one that is centered on the relationship to the
world, open to transformation, a regime that is in some way
inventive. We must no longer see fiction as a fable inscribed in
an unreal domain but a power that is able to be exercised on
the same level as the real, whether this 'real' is that of the
artistic medium or the political field. Thus, according to
Deleuze, Kafka and modern political cinema, faced with a
people who are colonised from a cultural point of view,
whether by "stories that have come from elsewhere" or by the
recuperation of its own myths by the colonisers, can only give
themselves "intercessors," which is to say a choice of
personae, "real and not fictional," who will set about
"fictioning." Fabulation, then, Deleuze concludes, "is speech in
action, a speech-act through which the persona continually
crosses the boundary which would separate his private
business from politics, and which itself produces collective
utterances."[13] I will examine these collective utterances
more closely below; my intention here is simply to bring out a
new configuration. It is not the same thing to sociologize and
instigate dissensus or to appeal to the differentials that are
still inhabited by a concern for the common. It is only in this
latter case, through the plurality of minorities or peoples, that
we can say: "the people are missing."
3. The Artist Between Power and Resistance
We must from now on try to think the opposition between the
major and the minor, or between the private and the
collective, without sacrificing too much to the dualism that is
so dear to Western culture. If we return to Kafka, we can see
that there is no question of opposing the minor and the major
by using marginal or popular artistic forms on the one hand
and the recognised forms of masterpieces on the other.
Art is said to be minor when it carries out an operation of
'minorization'. Minor literature is thus defined as a minor use
of language: "a minor literature," the authors warn, "doesn't
come from a minor language. It is rather that which a minority
constructs within a major language."[14] They describe the
position of the Jewish writer in Prague: "Kafka marks the
impasse that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague and
turns their literature into something impossible—the
impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in
German, the impossibility of writing otherwise." The important
point thus becomes that of deterritorialisation: to write in
German "is for the Prague Jews the feeling of an irreducible
distance from their primitive Czech territoriality." But German
is the language spoken by an "oppressive minority that speaks
a language cut off from the masses." "In short," the authors
conclude, "Prague German is a deterriorialized language." It is
precisely this, however, that makes it "appropriate for strange
and minor uses" and Deleuze and Guattari open a parenthesis
referring, "in another context" to "what blacks in America
today are able to do with the English language." It is thus the
operation of minorization that must be focused on and not an
abstract opposition between minor and major.
The same chapter, "What is a minor literature?," enumerates
three features of minor literatures that must all be thought
through the process of minorization. The first concerns
language, which we have just mentioned, the second concerns
the immediate connection of the business of the individual
matter to politics, which we started with, and the third is that
"everything takes on a collective value," the individual
enunciation has the value of a collective enunciation. Deleuze
and Guattari quote Kafka's Diary, dated 25 December 1911:
"Literature is less the concern of literary history than the
concern of the people." Literature (or one could just as well
say art in general) is what is liable to create this overlap
between the private and the collective, this coalescence or
even transmutation of the private into the collective, via an
artistic gesture in which the autonomy of art or the
prerogative of the author is no longer valid. The space of art
becomes the place where a revolution capable of constituting a
people in the name of culture is prefigured. To "minorize" is in
a certain way to harness the forces, effect variations in the
use of the major. The authors summarize their thought in
these terms: "The three characteristics of minor literature are
the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the
individual with a political immediacy, and the collective
assemblage of enunciation. We might as well say that "minor"
no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary
conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called
great (or established) literature." It is indeed via "the
possibility of setting up a minor practice of major language
from within" that one can define "popular literature, marginal
literature, and so on." This possibility makes the artist a
transformer whose action is less concerned with critique than
an incongruous use of reality, which changes it.
It is, in fact, important to bring out the way in which
minorization is like an "machine of expression" that minorizes
the major in a positive way, enriching it and thus does not
really rely on any opposition between two states that could be
absolutely distinguished as the major and minor registers. On
the level of its own medium, language, literary expression
activates the social field's immanent lines of force, which it has
been able to detect and amplify: its aim is not an imaginary
representation, without however claiming to be a substitute
for real struggles.[15] On the other hand it embodies the very
idea of struggle and revolution, testifying in this way to an
irrevocable political dimension for an art removed from any
immediate political message or goal. Other media would
implement other modes of minorization: it is a matter of
thinking minorization as a singular method with political value,
one that identifies the individual with the collective without
dreaming of suppressing singularities, and without seeking to
produce a single, abstract plan of action, being content with
outlining the always deferred horizon of the intolerable
connected with a line of flight. The operation of minorisation
thus conceived is inseparably related to its inverted form,
majorisation: minorisation and majorisation are the two
possible modalities of any "machine of enunciation."
Staying in the area of language, the knowledge that unifies it
and fixes its model and norm is carrying out, whatever it may
think, a political act, as expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in
the following terms in a Thousand Plateaux: "the scientific
model taking language as an object of study is one with the
political model by which language is homogenized, centralized,
standardized, becoming a language of power, a major or
dominant language."[16] But language by itself does not for its
part involve being major nor minor: "The major and minor
mode are two different treatments of language, one of which
consists in extracting constants from it, the other in placing it
in continuous variation." No use of language can be definitively
fixed as an object, any language can give rise to multiple and
conflictual practices, whether recognised and encouraged, only
tolerated or forbidden. The relationships of those for whom
expressing themselves is a profession with power are thus
particularly unstable. But the notion of "power" also demands
to be reconsidered: Deleuze and Guattari rail against the
illusory simplification that would identify power as a coherent,
unitary and stable entity.[17] Only "power relations" exist,
which come into play in any context and in particular with
laguage-use.
Every power relation is, as Michel Foucault showed during the
same period, both repressive and productive and one must
not obliterate the positive aspects which allow its truth effects
to be grasped. Knowledge is to be understood within the truth
games deployed in power relations. Major and minor refer to
modes of domination and resistance inscribed in all power,
corresponding to practices of minorization or majorization. The
Deleuzian and Foucauldian conceptions of power are close and,
in fact, in Kafka[18], after having signalled the closeness of
Foucault and Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari add, "Michel
Foucault has provided an analysis of power that reworks all of
today's economic and political questions. Although his method
is completely different, his analysis is not without a certain
Kafkaesque resonance. Foucault insists on the segmentarity
character of power, its contiguity, its immanence in the social
field (which does not mean an interiority of a soul or of a
subject along the lines of a superego). He shows that power
doesn't work at at all by the classical alternative of violence or
ideology, persuasion or constraint." Foucault and Deleuze meet
in the idea that resistance is inscribed within the very figure of
power or domination, as one of its dimensions. To take up
Foucault's words in 1982, "(. . .) resistance is an element of
this strategic relationship that power consists in. Resistance
always in fact draws strength from the situation that it
fights."[19] We are getting a clearer outline of the place of
art: art is neither on the side of power nor on the side of
resistance; it is not capable of occupying an absolute position.
It is one of power's stakes, by turns its place of celebration or
contestation, project of majorization or minorization. If it is
partly connected to resistance, it cannot be coextensive with
it. It is political without being compromised by an absolute
position as ally or enemy of the existing power. It is for this
reason in fact that the notion of "recuperation" is indispensable
for examining the relations between art and power. When we
consider precise local historical analyses, it seems that the
same work, depending on the era and circumstance, can
function as a support of the Prince or the State and as a
radical challenge to the existing power.
4. The Potential Community: A Value for Art and
Aesthetics?
In the artistic, theoretical or political domain, dissensus thus
refers to the factual state of affairs we encounter empirically,
what we each experience every day, and which refers to real
minorities in their diversity. But the idea of a people, which
has no content and is never filled, is not located at this level.
It accompanies the revolt of minoritarian practices, it is their
necessary invocation. This in no way saves a minoritarian
practice, whether artistic or cultural, when it succeeds in
inscribing its revolt on the terrain of reality, from the tendency
to impose itself in a practice of majorization: on the factual
level we see a constant inversion of the dominant/resistant
relationship, whereas resistance in its empty form demands to
be posited as a universal dimension. Foucault interprets the
way Kant speaks about revolution in these terms: "the
revolution, in any case, will risk falling back into its previous
rut, but as an event that is important in its very content, it
testifies by its existence to a permanent virtuality which
cannot be forgotten."[20] The content alone refers to the will
to revolution, "the revolution being simultaneously event,
rupture and historical upheaval, failure, but also value, sign of
the human species."
The philosopher doesn't go back on his position even when he
becomes aware that his engagement on the side of the
Ayatollah Khomeini poses a problem, given the development of
what he believed to be the occasion for introducing a spiritual
dimension into political life."[21] Faced with his detractors, he
maintains: "none of the disenchantments of history will make
any difference."[22] Outside of the political sphere, he sees in
certain revolts, even when they turn out badly, a reality that
brings with it a truth deserving support and thought: "one
must always oppose to power incontrovertible laws and
unlimited rights." Foucault takes on the paradoxical role of
maintaining both his initial support of Khomeini after the fact
and also his later reproach: "there is certainly no shame," he
writes, "in changing one's opinion; but there is no reason to
say that one has changed one's opinion because today one is
against hands being cut off, when yesterday one was against
Sawak's tortures." The "theoretical morality" of the
philosopher is thus "anti-strategic": "to be respectful,"
Foucault asks, "when a singularity emerges, but intransigent
as soon as power infringes on the universal. Simple and
difficult choice: because one must at the same time be on the
lookout, a bit above history, for what pierces and moves it,
and watch over, a little behind politics, what must limit it
unconditionally." We can well understand him: the writer
Kafka, the artist who minorises, or the specific intellectual,
maintain the tension between empirical singularities and a
universality that no longer has the face of a utopia.
Can such a theoretical morality still help us think concretely
today? Let's try: I'll use the simple example of the way that
André Rouillé, in the online journal PARISart[23] pleads the
case of the "pocket films," which he presents as a minor
cinema. The question is whether "faced with the major cinema
of the huge film industry," the "minor cinema" of mobile
telephone videos effectively opens a path for the birth of a
minor cinema. On the one side, we feel respect for the
singularities able to make a film; he leads us to look
sympathetically on a nomad cinema that is intimate and
spontaneous, which even allows each individual to be
simultaneously director, spectator and distributor of his or her
own films, "in relation to the enormous technological,
professional, economic and social logistics of major cinema."
But don't we also see in this, by contrast, the possibile
disappearance not only of all publically gathered communities,
but also any invocation of a virtual people? Rouillé writes: "the
social group, the professions and activities implied in the
cinematic spectacle are effaced in an intersecting process of
desocialization and individualization." Is this desocialization
and individualization balanced by "the broadly generalized
posture of exchanges and dialogues via networked
apparatuses"? It's the whole notion of audience which
demands to be rethought, but I remain mistrustful in the face
of anything that substitutes a hypothetical generalised
exchange on the level of the individual for the demand of the
dimension of the people.
The network is formed from the juxtaposition of a multiplicity
of individuals who are not bodily present. Their empirical
reality, which is no longer founded on a sensus communis, has
not found a political foundation either. The individual gesture
which cuts corners on artistic requirements deprives the
individual enunciation of political value. Let us return to Kafka:
in Kafka there is a renunciation of the principle of the narrator
as also on the polarity between narrator and character. Kafka
takes writing to a threshold of desubjectivation where the
subject of enunciation [sujet d'enonciation] and the subject of
the statement [sujet d'enoncé] disappear. The 'I' is multiple
and the assemblage of enunciation is collective, contituting a
sort of fourth person singular. The dimension of a people to
come is linked to the desubjectification of the writer who has
become an impersonal "one" [on] in a position to express a
potential community. When Deleuze and Guattari pose
questions regarding the collective character of the statement,
"even when it seems to be emitted by a solitary singularity
like that of the artist,"[24] they reply that "the statement
never refers back to a subject." The singular and the universal
fuse in a way in new statements which are not to be referred
to the singularity of the artist. The authors speak of the
Bachelor [Celibataire]: "the most individual literary enunciation
is a particular case of collective enunciation. This is even a
definition: a statement is literary when it is "taken up" by a
Bachelor who precedes the collective conditions of
enunciation."
In A Thousand Plateaus[25] they base the universality of the
singular, the collective value of the "bachelor" name, in their
manifest disposition to be open to multiplicities. ". . . The
proper name (le nom propre) does not designate an
individual: it is on the contrary when the individual opens up
to multiplicities pervading him or her, at the outcome of the
most severe operation of depersonalization, that he or she
acquires his or her true proper name. The proper name is the
instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity. The proper name
is the subject of a pure infinitive comprehended as such in a
field of intensity." Even if the artist signs the work with his
proper name, this name as an artist no longer belongs to him
or her: it serves as an intercessor in the invention of a
fictional process open to everyone. The people is no longer
invoked through the sole figure of an audience/receiver of the
work, it forms the necessary presupposition of any artistic
process. If I read Snow by Orhan Pamuk,[26] I hear multiple
voices, sometimes dissolved. The town of Kars by itself is like
a character, serving as a witness for the hero and the
narrator. In the profusion of the novel, it becomes difficult to
tell who is speaking, it is as if the author is divested of his
identity, making a gift of fictionalization to his intercessors.
This phenomenon is all the more noticeable when the writing
approaches autobiography, as in Istanbul: memories of a
city.[27] The writer's Istanbul absorbs the individual and
transforms the private into the collective. Hüzün, this feeling
close to spleen, is a shared humour. It is, according to the
author, "not melancholy, which is felt by a single person, but .
. . this black feeling felt jointly by millions of people;" a people
that becomes the public he addresses. Real people, missing
people? It is difficult to decide without reading the text in his
language, and impossible to make a ruling without taking the
context of the work's reception into account. Recent events
lead us, I think, to see in Pamuk an operation of minorization.
Deleuze and Guattari oppose to the widespread desire to be on
the side of the majority and power, the decision to take on
what they call in Kafka a "becoming-minor". "How many
styles," they lament, "or genres, or literary movements, even
very small ones, have only one single dream: to assume a
major function in language, to tender their services as
language of the State, official language (. . .) have the
opposite dream: know how to create a becoming-minor."[28]
Deleuze by himself in Critique et clinique[29] reprises the
same themes of the depersonalization of the artist and the
missing people: "Health as literature, as writing, consists in
inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the
fabulating function to invent a people. We do not write with
memories, unless it is to make them the collective origin or
destination of a people to come still ensconced in betrayals
and repudiations." Whether it is a matter of Kafka or Melville,
under Deleuze's pen literature appears as this delirium that
passes via peoples, the "races and tribes," and haunts
universal history: "all delirum is world-historical." The fiction of
the missing people is the mark of the inscription of politics
within art. It is through this, without appealing to the concepts
of the subject or the nation, that Gilles Deleuze situates art
and culture in their collective dimension and on a global scale.
We must now conclude regarding the potential displacement
that is effected by this idea of the missing people in relation to
the sensus communis and to the hope, at the heart of the
aesthetic, of instigating a new sociability by means of art. The
sociability specific to the aesthetic regime refers to a
consensual community: the public which itself is linked to the
double figure of a gathering of individuals and the indistinct
mass that they constitute. Such a public is marked with the
seal of consensuality. With the idea of the people who are
missing, by contrast, dissensus and consensus are linked in a
tension that is not able to be resolved. Art intervenes as
resistance and dissenting energy founded on a visceral refusal
of the consensus. However it is paradoxically animated by the
just as visceral affirmation of a necessary foundation played by
the role of the public but which can only be invoked under the
name of the people, and moreover in its absence. It is from
the angle of minorization that art acquires its political
dimension and not through a given engagement that is
claimed to be political: art carries with it the absence and the
call of a people. The cry "the people are missing" is only heard
after mourning the sensus communis.
There is an artist who has been able to provide a precise
image of what I have just laboriously presented. Romeo
Castellucci, for the third episode of his Tragedia
Endogonidia,[30] condemning the absence of the people,
installed in the orchestra seats large, black, human-sized
rabbits, identical like clones and without expression. These
chair-fillers were read as signifying "the great precariousness
of humanization."[31] This inert non-public, that we can
imagine being cooperative and consensual, is the one that fills
the theatres and takes part in an operation of majorization.
The installation of this stage director appeals, through this
image taken from a terrible nightmare, to a political regime of
art, pointing out in turn the observation that serves as the
foundation of art and culture: "the people are missing."
Translated by Melissa McMahon and revised by Richard
Woodfield.
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